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In bis recent contribution to the literature on the moral 
status of animals, Peter Carruthers argues that "some 
version of contractualism provides us with the most 
acceptable framework for moral theory," and be defends 
two central claims about sucb a theory: that it provides 
"a theoretical framework that accords full moral 
standing to all human beings, while non-arbitrarily 
withholding such standing from animals," and that it 
can account for many common-sense beliefs about the 
treatment of animals, while at the same time providing 
"no support for those who would wish to extend still 
further the moral protection already available" to them.' 
I am not concemed here to question the merits either 
of contractarian2 moral theory in general, or of 
Carruthers' version of it in particular. Instead, I want to 
grant the acceptability of such a theory for the sake of 
the argument, and to challenge Carruthers' two crucial 
claims about it. First, I will argue that if moral 
contractarianism provides support for common-sense 
restrictions on our treatment of animals for the sorts of 
reasons that Carruthers develops, then it provides 
support for extending moral protection substantially 
beyond the level currently available to them; I will 
argue, in particular, that if Carruthers' arguments are 
successful, they also provide acontractarianjustification 
for morally criticizing the practice of factory farming, 
though this is meant merely as one example. Second, 
without attempting to settle the question of precisely 
which additional restrictions on our treatmentofanimals 
such contractarian arguments might ultimately be used 
to underwrite, I will argue that whatever principles are 
finally agreed to, they involve attributing to animals a 
moral standing that is just as "full" as the moral status 
such arguments accord to some humans. 
I. 
Acontraetualistmoral theory, as Carruthers uses the tenn, 
is one which "views morality as the resultofan imaginary 
contractbetween rational agents, who are agreeing upon 
rules to govern their subsequent behavior," and which 
attempts "to justify a system of moral principles by 
showing that they would be agreed upon by rational 
agents in certain ideal circumstances" (pp. 35-36). The 
best-known version of such a theory remains that ofJobn 
Rawls, in which the ideal circumstances requisite for 
ensuring impartiality are generated by endowing rational 
agents with general knowledge of the social sciences and 
then placing them behind a "veil of ignorance" which 
keeps them from knowing facts about their particular 
characteristics and circumstances. Rawls is himself 
primarily concemed to apply this method to the problem 
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of political justice, but Carruthers rightly notes that it 
can be extended to provide a general theory of morality: 
morality consists of those rules governing human conduct 
which would be agreed to by agents placed in such ideal 
circumstances.3 
Carruthers expresses some concern that contrac-
tualist moral theory not be identified exclusively witb 
its Rawlsian version, and so notes that on tbe view 
developed by Thomas Scanlon, tbe agents involved are 
allowed tbe sort of knowledge of their particular 
situation wbich is ruled out in Rawls' version. The 
account of morality, on this view, is that "moral rules 
are those that no one could reasonably reject as a basis 
for free, unforced, general agreement amongst people 
who share the aim of reaching such an agreement" (p. 
38). But Carruthers suggests that tbe idealizations 
exploited by Scanlon achieve the same effect as Rawls' 
veil of ignorance,4 and he continues to employ this 
Rawlsian device in his own discussions of contrac-
tualism in general. I will follow Carruthers, then, in 
characterizing the contractarian theory of morality as 
one on which the rules of morality are those which 
would be selected by rational agents from behind a veil 
of ignorance. And I want to follow Carruthers in asking 
two questions: what is the content of the principles 
regulating our treatment of animals which would be 
agreed to under such conditions? And how does tbe moral 
status which is conferred to animals by the acceptance 
of such principles differ from the moral status which is 
conferred on some humans by the acceptance of 
principles regulating our treatment of them? 
II. 
Carruthers develops two distinct arguments to show that 
rational agents choosing principles of conduct from 
behind a veil of ignorance would accept some 
restrictions on their treatment of animals. This is 
important, on Carruthers' account, because if it could 
be shown that sucb agents would embrace a code of 
behavior which imposed no limits at all on their 
treatment of animals, this would likely be taken as too 
strongly counterintuitive to allow the theory as a whole 
to achieve a position of reflective equilibrium. It is 
possible, of course, that Carruthers' two arguments5 for 
the acceptance of such restrictions will be found to be 
unconvincing, and that his defense of contractarianism 
will be rejected as implausible for that very reason. I 
will not offer any defense of his arguments here, but 
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will instead argue that if they are accepted, then, 
contrary to Carruthers, there is no good reason toprevent 
them from being used to justify moral restrictions on 
our treatment of animals which go substantially beyond 
those which are presently accepted. 
Carruthers' first argument concerns the great distress 
which causing an animal to suffer in turn causes to those 
humans who care deeply about the well-being of 
animals. Causing such distress by causing an animal to 
suffer for trivial reasons, Carruthers says, "would violate 
the right of animal lovers to have their concerns 
respected and taken seriously" (p. 107). And since well-
infonned rational agents can expect that there will be 
many people who will have such concerns, "this may 
place on us an obligation not to cause suffering to 
animals, except for powerful reasons" (p. 106). 
Although Carruthers does not put it in this way, the 
point might best be understood as follows: as a rational 
agent behind a veil of ignorance, I do not know whether 
I will be one of those people who don't mind kicking a 
dog for trivial reasons or one of those who are deeply 
grieved by seeing another doing so. But because I expect 
tbe loss to me from such actions being morally permitted 
if I tum out to be a dog-lover to be greater than the gain 
to me if I prove to be a dog-hater, I do best by agreeing 
to a principle which would morally condemn a person 
for kicking a dog for trivial reasons. Reasoning under 
conditions of uncertainty, that is, I must cboose the 
outcome with the best worse-case results, and it will be 
better to be a slightly inconvenienced dog-hater than a 
deeply-distressed dog-Iover.6 
Carruthers takes it that sucb an argument succeeds 
in equipping contractarianism with the ability to 
accommodate some of our common-sense views about 
the treatment of animals. But he insists that the 
argument, if accepted, cannot be extended to criticize 
such practices as painful methods of factory farming 
or of testing new commercial products on animals 
"even granting that the purposes subserved by such 
activities (cheaper meat, and new varieties of 
shampoo) are trivial." And his reason for this is that 
the constraints generated by this argument "would only 
apply to suffering that occurs in a manner that is 
unavoidably public": 
For it Seems that one can legitimately reply to 
those who complain of such activities [e.g., 
factory farming] in exactly the way that one 
would reply to those who are distressed by 
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unusual sexual practices, for example. One can 
say: 'If it upsets you, don't think about it.' 
While granting that an unusual sexual practice 
(or the suffering of an animal) should not be 
flaunted in public, because of the offence this 
may occasion, it seems there can be no 
objection to it occurring in private (p. 107). 
Now on many views of morality, it is indeed 
perfectly legitimate to reply to people who are distressed 
by the thought of what others do in the privacy of their 
own homes simply by saying, "if it upsets you, don't 
think about it." But the question is whether this can be 
a legitimate reply on the sort of contractarian account 
which Carruthers seems to envision. And it seems that 
it cannot. If people do think about it, and if thinking 
about it does upset them, then the fact of their distress 
is just as good a reason not to harm the animal in private 
as it was a reason not to harm it in public (after all, even 
in the case of witnessing a public beating, one could be 
admonished not to think about it). Indeed, it is the very 
same reason: choosing rules of conduct from behind a 
veil of ignorance, I do not know if I will be a person 
who gains some marginal advantage by producing meat 
sauce instead of tomato sauce or one who finds that she 
cannot avoid thinking about the great suffering animals 
must endure to provide such trivial benefits and who is 
greatly distressed as a result. In the absence of such 
knowledge, I decline to risk the greater cost, which is 
the serious distress ratller than the trivial benefit, and 
so agree to a rule which would condemn the causing of 
such suffering in private as well as public places. 
This analysis of the case of causing an animal to 
suffer away from IDe public view also reveals the crucial 
disanalogy between the examples of animal suffering 
and nonstandard sexual practices, a disanalogy which 
Carruthers overlooks entirely. Consider, for example, 
the question of whether private homosexual intercourse 
should be morally condemned. From behind the veil of 
ignorance, I do not know if I will be a homosexual or a 
person who is disturbed by the knowledge that other 
people engage in homosexual intercourse in the privacy 
of their own homes. Again, from the cOl1tractarian 
perspective, I cannot simply tell myself that if I am the 
latter sort of person I should simply be told to stop 
thinking about it, because such a person does think about 
it and does find himself distressed as a result. So the 
cost which will be imposed on me if I find myself tlle 
sort of person who has such thoughts must be taken 
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into account in my deliberations from behind the veil 
of ignorance. But in this case, surely, the cost to me 
will be far greater if I tum out to be a homosexual who 
finds himself prohibited from pursuing sexual 
fulfillment, and so from behind the veil of ignorance, I 
will agree to accept principles which deem private 
homosexual intercourse to be morally unobjectionable. 
In both cases, then, the contractarian cannot simply 
ignore the costs to those who fmd themselves distressed 
by their thoughts of what others are permitted to do in 
private, nor can ilie weight of iliose costs justifiably be 
discounted. Sometimes they will be greater than ilie 
benefits to others and sometimes not, and so the 
restrictions which are grounded in ilie distress caused 
in this manner will have to be assessed by the 
contracting agents on a case by case basis. 
Now two objections might be raised at this point. 
One is that in attempting to sever the case of 
homosexuality from the case of factory farming, I have 
underestimated how deeply disturbed many people 
will be by the thought iliat oiliers are morally permitted 
to engage in homosexual intercourse in ilie privacy of 
their own homes. Perhaps their stress will be so great 
as to outweigh ilie cost to homosexuals of prohibiting 
their pursuit of sexual fulfillment. The oilier is iliat, 
even if I am right in iliis particular case, iliere will 
still be many other instances of private behavior in 
which ilie trivial benefits to ilie participants will be 
less than ilie cost in distress to iliose who disapprove, 
so that we will have to accept moral restrictions on 
many forms of private behavior typically thought to 
be morally unobjectionable. But these considerations, 
if established, would show only that a contractarian of 
the sort Carruthers has in mind would be forced to 
conclude that such forms of behavior are immoral. This 
might count as an objection to iliis sort of contrac-
tarianism itself, but it does nothiI 6 to undermine the 
claim that this is how such a contractarian should weigh 
the costs of distress in determining which rules would 
be chosen by rational agents deliberating from behind 
a veil of ignorance. It may well be that there are 
compelling reasons not to accept as moral ilie rules 
which agents would choose in such circumstances. My 
claim here has simply been iliat if we allow such agents 
to consider the distress caused to individuals by tlJeir 
knowledge of public harm to animals caused for trivial 
reasons, ilien there is no good reason to prevent them 
from considering the distress caused to those who fmd 
iliemselves upset by tlJeir knowledge that similar harms 
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are allowed to be inflicted on animals in private. The 
distress caused to those concerned about the pains 
inflicted on animals in factory fanning is great and the 
benefits to those who benefit trivial,? so if Carruthers' 
argument from distress provides a reason to suppose 
that rational agents behind a veil of ignorance would 
accept any restrictions on their treatment of animals at 
all, then it also provides a reason, and an equally 
convincing reason, to suppose that they would agree to 
condemn factory fanning.s 
m. 
Carruthers' second argument for the claim that rational 
agents behind a veil of ignorance would accept 
restrictions on their treatment of animals rests on the 
importance that such agents would attach to the 
development of good character. Since people often act 
from general dispositions and not strictly from 
deliberate adherence to explicitly formulated principles, 
Carruthers argues, such agents would agree not only to 
endorse the merits of certain rules of conduct, but also 
to encourage the development of those dispositions and 
traits of character which would best ensure compliance 
with them. In particular, he urges, such agents would 
likely agree to accept not only duties ofnon-interference 
with others, but also duties of assistance, and the most 
reasonable account of such duties would require each 
person "to develop a general disposition to help those 
in need, to be exercised when the opportunity arises to 
do so at no comparable cost to themselves." They would 
agree, in other words, to develop "a general attachment 
to the good of others" (p. 152), which would in turn 
commit them to trying "to develop a ready sympathy 
for one another's suffering" (p. 154), 
And this in tum, Carruthers argues, would provide 
the basis for condemning acts which cause suffering to 
animals for trivial reasons (or for no reason at all or for 
their own sake). "Such actions," he argues, "are wrong 
because they are cruel. They betray an indifference to 
suffering that may manifest itself... in that person's 
dealings with otherrational agents" (pp. 153-54),9 This 
is not to say that the contracting agents would want the 
people themselves to believe that the reason for acting 
kindly toward animals was that this was an effective 
way of improving their prospects for acting kindly 
toward other humans. The people being praised would 
have a direct sympathetic response to the suffering of 
animals, and the people being criticized would not. But 
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the agents doing the evaluating from behind the veil of 
ignorance would criticize the absence of sympathy for 
animals on the grounds that it represented a potential 
threat to other people. So the contractarian may have a 
way to justify restrictions on our treatment of animals 
that is independentofappeals to the distress such actions 
may cause in animal lovers. 
As with Carruthers' first argument, I am again 
concerned not to assess the merits of the argument itself, 
but to ask whether, if it is admitted, there are any good 
reasons to refuse to extend it beyond the limited 
restrictions on our treatment of animals which are 
already generally accepted, and in particular whether 
there are reasons not to extend it to a moral criticism of 
factory farming. Carruthers maintains that this 
argument, like the previous one, cannot be so extended, 
again granting that the social benefits offactory farming 
are themselves trivial. His reason is this: whether or 
not an act displays a defect of character depends on the 
circumstances and the motive from which it is 
performed. It is only when a person causes an animal 
to suffer for trivial reasons that he reveals a lack of 
sympathy that will be worrisome to the imagined 
rational contractors. And in the case of people who 
inflict pain on animals in their work on a factory fann, 
"the motives from which the people in question are 
acting are by no means trivial, since they are earning a 
livelihood." 
There is thus no scope, here, for criticising the 
overall practices offactory farming and animal 
experimentation.... This point is important 
because even if the reasons why we have such 
practices are trivial-cheaper meat and new 
varieties of cosmetics-the motives of those 
who engage in them are not. There is then no 
reason to claim that those people are cruel in 
what they do (pp. 159-60). 
There are two problems with this response. One is 
that it seriously misrepresents the character from which 
the worker on the factory fann acts. To point out that 
such people earn a living at what they do suggests that 
they act from the motive of earning a living, as if they 
are faced with the choice of causing suffering to animals 
for trivial social benefits and earning a living, or not 
causing suffering to animals for trivial social benefits 
and earning no living at all. This impression is 
reinforced in the context of another argument, when 
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Carrutbers writes tbat it is "too much to demand tbat 
people should forgo employment out of respect for tbe 
feelings of animal lovers" (p. 167). But the choice is 
typically not between earning a living and not earning 
a living, but between different ways of earning a living. 
And given the existence of jobs with roughly 
comparable demands and compensations, a preference 
for the job which causes pain to animals for trivial social 
benefits is itself trivial, and the motive from which one 
acts in choosing to indulge such a preference is truly 
indifferent to the suffering of animals. to 
Now it may at this point be objected that in the real 
world, workers do not always have their choice of 
occupations and that a person may well be faced witb 
the choice of taking a job that requires him to harm 
animals for trivial social benefits and taking no job at 
all. And surely in such cases, he acts from a nontrivial 
motive in accepting such ajob. But the question which 
the rational contractors behind the veil of ignorance 
must face is precisely whether it would be best that this 
be the sort of world in which they live. They must 
decide, that is, whether the pool of jobs from which it 
will be considered morally permissible to compete 
should include some jobs which involve causing 
suffering to animals for trivial social gains. Suppose 
most people who presently work for factory fanus are 
simply motivated by a desire to eanl a living. l1 Then 
they will be equally satisfied if the agents choose amoral 
system which demands that the resources currently 
dedicated to factory faIms should instead be allocated 
to creating other jobs which do not inHict pain on 
animals for trivial social purposes. But suppose tbere 
are a few who are motivated not by the desire to earn a 
living, but by the desire to earn a living specifically by 
inHicting serious hanns on animals for trivial social 
gains. They, and only they, would be disappointed by 
the absence of such jobs. But their motive, unlike the 
motive of those who simply want to earn a living, is a 
cruel one, one which betrays an indifference to the 
suffering of animals. And so if Carruthers is right that 
contracting agents behind a veil of ignorance will want 
to minimize the flourishing of such motives, they will 
choose a moral system which condemns allowing 
resources to be allocated for the creation of the sorts of 
jobs which could only be preferred by those with such 
motives. So if the concern about chaI'acter which 
Carruthers identifies is sufficient to justify condemning 
those who harm animals from trivial moti\'~s, then it 
will be sufficient to justify agreeing to the moral 
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superiority of an economy in which people do not 
compete for jobs which cause pain to animals for trivial 
social benefits. 
The second problem with Carruthers' attempt to 
rescue factory farming from the implications of his 
character-based argument is that he nowhere considers 
the character of the people who buy and consume the 
meat which makes tbe factory farm jobs possible. But 
even if it is plausible to claim that the workers who 
harm the animals act from nontrivial motives, it is not 
plausible to claim that this is so of the consumers who 
ultimately pay their salaries. The person who indulges 
in a preference for meat lasagna instead of vegetable 
lasagna does not act from the nontrivial motive ofeating 
rather tban not eating, but from the trivial motive of 
gaining an incremental increase in pleasure or 
convenience. Unless he finds himself in extremely 
unusual circumstances, in which factory-farmed meat 
offers tbe only prospects for nourishment, the consumer 
of the factory farm's products clearly acts from a motive 
which is indifferent to tbe pain of animalsP And so 
again, if Carruthers is right that contracting agents 
behind tbe veil of ignorance would condemn behavior 
which issues from such motives, then they would agree 
to condemn those who purchase and eat factory-farmed 
meat. And so even if such agents did not decide, as my 
first objection suggested, to condemn the allocation of 
resources to creating such meat-producing jobs in the 
first place, they would still agree to endorse a set of 
moral dispositions which would have the effect of 
leaving the factory farm industry to wither away. 
Now it might be objected to this last argument that 
the consumer, unlike the factory-farm worker, betrays 
no indifference to the pain of tbe animals if he does not 
stand by and idly watch as tbe animals attempt to escape 
or listen unaffected to their cries of pain. But if the 
customer is truly not so indifferei . TO their suffering, 
and so would be unwilling himself to participate in or 
bear wilIless to such painful practices being carried out 
simply for the sake of producing a slightly tastier meal, 
then his purchase of tbe end result still betrays an 
indifferent character. He is like the man who cannot 
bring himself to murder his estranged wife but who can 
witb peace of mind hire someone else to do it for him. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that on the contractarian 
account of morality hiring a hit man is to be equated 
witb ordering chicken McNuggets. It is simply to say 
that the relationship between doing something that 
betrays an unacceptable character and paying to hhve 
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someone else do it for you must be viewed as the same 
in both cases. The contractarian will presumably want 
to condemn the lack of sympathy of the person who 
hires the hit man, even if the person is himself too 
sensitive to inflict the hann himself. And so ifCarruthers 
is right to claim that contracting agents will criticize 
people who cause pain to animals for trivial reasons, 
then such agents will also have reason to criticize those 
who enjoy the trivial benefits while paying others to 
inflict the requisite pain. If the character-basedargument 
suffices to accommodate the common-sense views 
which Carruthers wishes to accommodate, then it must 
also underwrite a moral criticism of factory fanning. 
Carruthers makes one further claim which might in 
part be understood as a rebuttal to the attempt to extend 
either the argument from distress to animal lovers or 
the argument from the importance of character into a 
moral criticism of factory fanning. This is the claim 
that to do so would be to increase our concern with 
animal welfare beyond its present level and that 
the cost of increasing concern with animal 
welfare is to distract attention from the needs 
of those who certainly do have moral 
standing-namely, human beings. We live on 
a planet where millions of our fellow humans 
starve, or are near starving, and where many 
millions more are undernourished. In addition, 
the twin perils of pollution and exhaustion of 
natural resources threaten the futures of 
ourselves and our descendants. It is here that 
moral attention should be focused. Concern 
with animal welfare, while expressive of 
states of character that are admirable, is an 
irrelevance to be opposed rather than 
encouraged (p. 168).13 
Carruthers acknowledges that one might object that 
it is always possible to be concerned with both animal 
and human welfare, but he protests that "in fact, much 
of the moral energy currently spent in defense of animals 
has been diverted from other domains." And this is 
surely something that could not please rational agents 
assessing our culture from behind a veil of ignorance. 
Now it is tempting to respond to all of this, at least 
in the case of factory farming, by claiming that well-
informed rational agents would be likely to conclude 
that the inefficiency of factory fanning is an important 
cause of the very problems of starvation, malnutrition, 
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and exhaustion of natural resources, and so would 
choose to condemn it for that reason alone. And given 
that this is a fairly wide-spread view of the social costs 
of factory fanning, it is somewhat disappointing that 
Carruthers does not address it. But there is a more 
general point to be made here than this: if it is the case 
that a great deal of valuable moral energy is currently 
being used to attack factory fanning, this is surely 
because so many people do not presently believe that 
factory farming is morally objectionable. But the 
rational agents behind the veil of ignorance are trying 
precisely to decide which moral beliefs they think it 
would be best for everyone to have. If I have been 
successful in showing that the considerations Carruthers 
would have them give weight to would lead these agents 
to conclude that the best moral beliefs should include 
the belief that factory fanning is objectionable, then no 
energy would be wasted opposing factory fanning 
because everyone would agree that it is wrong. People 
do not currently devote their time to railing against the 
immorality of murder, after all, since its wrongness is 
generally recognized. Instead, they may worry about 
how it can best be prevented. But while it is difficult to 
determine how best to prevent crime or disease or 
overpopulation or other serious human problems, it is 
not difficult to determine how best to prevent factory 
farming. Rational agents would recognize this 
difference, and so would see no significant cost in terms 
ofvaluable moral energy in accepting a principle which 
condemned factory fanning. 14 
IV. 
I have argued thus far that if rational agents behind a 
veil of ignorance would have reason to accept 
Carruthers' arguments for embracing moral principles 
which place restrictions on their treatment of animals, 
then they would also have reason to accept principles 
which would extend moral protection to animals 
substantially beyond the level generally accorded them. 
If they agree to morally criticize individuals who harm 
animals for trivial reasons, then they will also agree to 
morally criticize social institutions and industries (and 
the people who support them) which hann animals for 
trivial social gains. I have used the case of factory 
fanning as an example of this, since it is one which 
Carruthers explicitly concedes to produce only trivial 
benefits and claims to be morally unobjectionable, but 
if my arguments have been sound, then the same 
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criterion would also be used to assess the use of animals 
for entertainment, sport, clothing, product testing, and 
so forth, as well as more "humane" methods of 
converting them into food. There is obviously room here 
for disagreement about which specific uses of animals 
such agents would ultimately accept and which they 
would reject, but I want now to assume that question 
has been satisfactorily resolved. Some cases of hanning 
animals will be morally criticized and some will not, 
and some cases of hanning humans will be morally 
criticized and some will not. 
I want now to raise a question about the moral status 
which is accorded to animals by virtue of accepting 
these principles. Carruthers claims that moral 
contractarianism can justify according full moral 
standing to all humans while denying it to aU animals, 
meaning that it can justify recognizing direct duties to 
an humans and only indirect ones to animals. On the 
face of it, this should seem surprising since only 
rational agents can participate in the imagined 
deliberations and not all humans are rational agents. 
But Carruthers develops two arguments to show that 
humans who are not rational agents (e.g., infants, the 
severely retarded; for brevity, I will use the somewhat 
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unattractive phrase "marginal humans") should 
nonetheless be accorded direct moral standing on the 
comractarian picture of morality. I want to argue that if 
this is so, then so should animals. 
Carruthers' main argument for according moral 
standing to marginal humansl5 is a version of the slippery 
slope argument. Contracting agents behind the veil of 
ignorance might initially be tempted to agree to principles 
which would attach moral standing only to rational agents 
while withholding it from marginal humans. Such agents 
are rational, after all, and so know that they will not 
themselves be marginal humans, and they therefore have 
no obvious reason to accord such humans direct moral 
standing. But Carruthers argues that in choosing moral 
principles, such agents must not only consider what the 
principles themselves say, but must also "pay attention 
to the ways in which those principles might be distorted 
or abused" (p. 115). In particular, the contracting agents 
will know that while there is a clear and easily-applied 
distinction between humans and nonhumans, there is no 
such sharp boundary between a human who barely 
qualifies as a rational agent and a human who barely 
doesn't. Moral principles which accord direct standing 
to agents but not to marginal humans, then, "would be 
inherently susceptible to abuse by unscrupulous people" 
in a way that principles which accorded standing to 
humans but not to nonhumans would not (p. 115). 
Principles which relied on tenuous distinctions between 
human agents and human patients could too readily be 
used, for example, to convince people to deny rights to 
those who are perceived to be sexually deviant, or 
merely intellectually inferior, while principles which 
relied on the clear and absolute distinction between 
humans and nonhumans could not. To accept moral 
principles which exclude marginal humans from direct 
standing, these contracting agents would therefore 
conclude, would be to agree to put themselves in a 
position from which a slippery slope would easily lead 
to "all kinds ofbarbarisms against those who are rational 
agents" (p. 114). 
Now one might think that the most an argument of 
this sort could establish would be that rational agents 
would agree to treat marginal humans as if they had 
direct moral standing. They are convinced to accept the 
theory which accords direct standing to marginal 
humans, that is, not because they think that it is the 
best theory to govern their interaction, but because they 
worry that the theory that really is best (the one which 
attributes direct standing only to agents) is too likely to 
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be abused in the real world. They accord direct standing 
to marginal humans, then, not because they believe that 
marginal humans really merit such standing, but because 
they believe that it is convenient to accord such standing 
to them. But Carruthers denies that, from the 
contractarian point of view, there can be such a 
distinction between saying that a being really merits 
moral standing and saying that it is convenient to accord 
it such standing (see pp. 116-17). Legitimate moral 
principles just are those which rational agents choosing 
from behind a veil of ignorance would accept. The 
slippery slope argument shows that they would have 
reason to accept principles on which all humans have 
direct moral standing. So, on the contractarian account, 
all humans do have direct moral standing. 
Once again, I am not concerned to question the 
merits of Carruthers' argument. But if it is accepted, 
there is no clear reason why it should not be extended 
to show that animals, too, have direct moral standing. 
I do not mean by this that a suitably revised slippery 
slope argument would make the contracting agents fear 
that a theory which denied moral standing to animals 
would be abused to deny standing to them as well. 
This does not seem plausible. Rather, I have in mind 
Carruthers' claim that to show that marginal humans 
have direct standing one must merely show that the 
contracting agents would have some reason to want 
people to accept a moral theory which made such a 
claim. For it seems that the direct moral standing of 
animals could be established using precisely the same 
strategy, and from considerations which Carruthers has 
himself already endorsed. 
Carruthers has argued, remember, that rational 
agents will have reason to endorse the inculcation of a 
sympathetic disposition toward animals in which the 
actions of people who have the right sort of character 
"are undertaken for the sake of the animals in question." 
The contracting agents endorse the merits of such a 
disposition because of its beneficial effects for other 
people, it is true, but the disposition which they thereby 
endorse nonetheless views animals as mattering for their 
own sakes: "For this is what having the right kind of 
sympathetic virtue consists in" (p. 154). Following our 
discussion ofmarginal humans, then, we might initially 
be tempted to say that rational agents would agree to a 
set of moral principles on which when it is wrong to 
harm an animal it is wrong because the animal has moral 
standing, not because the rational agents believe that 
animals merit such standing, but because they believe 
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that it will be beneficial to humans to act on the 
convenient belie/that animals have such standing. But, 
if we accept Carruther's argument in the case of 
marginal humans, we must conclude that to say that 
rational agents would agree to principles which praise 
those who view animals as having moral standing is 
simply to say that rational agents would agree to accord 
animals such standing, which is to say that on the 
contractarian account animals have such standing. 
Carruthers acknowledges that the person with the 
sort of character which the rational agents will 
recommend will be likely to think "that animal suffering 
has moral standing, mattering for its own sake. For those 
who have the right moral dispositions in this area will 
act for the sake of the animal when prompted by feelings 
of sympathy" (p. 157). But he insists that this would be 
an "illusion" resulting from a failure to recognize that 
there may be a variety of different levels to 
moral thinking. On the one hand there is the 
level of thought that manifests our settled 
moral dispositions and attitudes (this is where 
sympathy for animal suffering belongs), but 
on the other hand there is the level of 
theoretical reflection upon those dispositions 
and attitudes, asking how they may bejustified 
by an acceptable moral theory. It is at this level 
that we come to realise, as contractualists, that 
animals are without moral standing (p. 157). 
But if this distinction justifies thinking of the moral 
standing of animals as merely an "illusion" which it is 
useful to cause people to fall into at the level of thought 
that manifests their settled moral attitudes, then it must 
equally justify thinking of the moral standing of 
marginal humans as an illusion which it is useful to 
agree to have people accept at the same level. At the 
level of the moral beliefs which the contractarian thinks 
that people ought to have, after all, marginal humans 
are a matter of direct concern, but at the level of 
theoretical reflection, the contractarian teaches that such 
beliefs are justified solely on the grounds that they 
benefit other rational agents, who seen from this 
perspective are the only ones who are ofdirect concern. 
I am not concerned here to insist that we must 
therefore characterize animals as having direct moral 
standing on the contractarian account. We mightjust as 
naturally say that both they and marginal humans are 
only of indirect concern, although in both cases rational 
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agents agree that people have reason to see them as 
objects of direct concern. The point is simply that the 
two cases should stand or fall togeUler, so that in either 
case, Carruthers has failed to provide a significant sense 
in which all humans do, and all animals do not, have 
"full" moral standing. 
v. 
I have, throughout this paper, resisted commenting on 
the merits of Carruthers' arguments for recognizing 
minimal restrictions on our treatment of culimals, and I 
will resist again in conclusion. For the point of tllis paper 
has not been that those who seek to extend the moral 
protection of animals beyond the levels presently 
accorded them should abandon their conuniunent to 
consequentialist or deontological moral theories and 
instead embrace contractariculism as the most effective 
way to further their cause. 1l1ere may well prove to be 
good reasons to reject contractarianism as a moral 
theory. The point has rather been Ulat there are people 
who seek to deny further moral protection to CUlimalS 
without lapsing into the unacceptable view that we have 
no moral duties regarding animals at all, culd that 
Carruthers presents contractarianism as a view that 
furthers their cause. But this contractarian gcunbit, as 
he develops it, ultimately runs aground on a dilemma: 
either Carruthers' arguments for generating minimal 
duties regarding animals fail, in which case the 
contractarian theory must be rejected as unacceptably 
counterintuitive, or his arguments succeed, in which 
case they also generate moral judgments about our 
treatment of animals which go substantially beyond 
those presently accepted, bOtll in terms of their content 
and in terms of the moral status they accord to llilimals.16 
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interchangeably. 
3 It is worth noting that RawIs himself resists the claim 
that the contractarian model can be used to underwrite a 
complete theory of morality. Even if it is extended beyond 
justice to all of the social virtues, he acknowledges, "it would 
seem to include only our relations with other persons and to 
leave out of account how we are to conduct ourselves toward 
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 17). It is 
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5 Strictly speaking, there is a third argument grounded in 
the likelihood that such agents would accept rules of private 
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one person from harming animals which belonged to another. 
But even Carruthers concedes that "an appeal to property 
rights cannot take us very far in attempting to reconcile 
contractualism with commonsense attitudes," (p. 106) so I 
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6 Carruthers does not explicitly frame his argument in 
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preference satisfaction. But Carruthers is concerned to defend 
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factory farms. But this is misleading: if meat production were 
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Since no animal lovers would be made aware of the suffering 
caused to the animals, none would be caused any distress. 
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directly by appealing to a publicity condition which would 
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is available on Carruthers' account. So it may be in principle 
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be kept secret, then secret factory farming would be morally 
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9 As Carruthers notes (pp. 157-58), this is the sort of 
argument defended by Kant (in "Duties to Animals and 
Spirits," in his Lectures on Ethics) and it goes back to medieval 
scholastics such as Aquinas (e.g., Summa Contra Gentiles, 
Book III, Part n, Chap. CXn) if not further; as Keith Thomas 
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10 This objection might be taken as merely one illustration 
of a more general problem with Carruthers' argument. 
Carruthers' argument rests on the general claim that whenever 
a person is earning a living, that person is acting from 
nontrivial motives. But we can imagine any number of trivial 
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earning a living over another. A person may go to work for a 
certain company, for example, because he has a preference 
for working for companies which advertise on even-numbered 
pages in the phone book, but surely the fact that he makes a 
living working for the company does not show that his motive 
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11 This supposition seems supported by the extremely high 
turnover rate for such positions. 
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blissfully ignorant of these conditions. This raises the 
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example). And so if I am right to suggest that the 
contractarian would insist on forbidding corporate secrecy 
(see footnote 8 above), then he may well be left agreeing 
with the claim that "if a factory-farm consumer's ignorance 
of the farm's conditions reveals no defect of character, then 
his purchasing of factory-farmed meat reveals no defect of 
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deny the truth of the claim's antecedent. So the consumer 
will, on this account, be legitimately accused of indifference 
to the suffering of animals, either because he knowingly 
contributes to it for such trivial benefits, or because he cares 
too little about it to obtain even the most generally accessible 
information about it. 
13 Carruthers has harsher words in his preface: ''I regard 
the present popular concern with animal rights in our culture 
as a reflection of moral decadence" (xi). 
14 It is possible, of course, that in launching this objection 
Carruthers should be understood as stepping outside of his 
contractarian framework, that his complaint is not that 
contracting agents would fear a waste of moral energy if 
they accept greater moral restrictions on the treatment of 
animals but, rather, that in the world as things presently 
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restrictions and would instead, if accepted, seem to show 
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after the decisions that would be made by rational agents 
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15 Carruthers presents a second argument from the 
desirability of social stability (pp. 117-18), but my response 
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16 I would like to thank David DeGrazia, Dale Jamieson, 
Harlan B. Miller, Jon Mandie, Alec Walen and Sara Worley 
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